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1 Introduction
Governments should provide high quality services and charge low taxes. In the last decades
outsourcing has been widely used as an instrument to reduce costs and boost the budget of both
local and central governments (see surveys by World Bank 1995, Shleifer 1998, and Megginson
and Netter 2001). Most public service provision is done in environments where it is diﬃcult
to contract upon all contingencies. In this paper we focus on how ressource allocation can be
improved by delegating the outsourcing decision to politically motivated agencies.
While outsourcing often reduces costs, it is less obvious how it aﬀects the quality of public
services: In areas like electricity provision or garbage collection, where quality is easy to contract
upon ex ante and monitor ex post, outsourcing and/or privatization can imply cheaper service
provision at a higher level of quality. In areas like health care, elderly care, police enforcement
or military combat service, where it is diﬃcult to describe, monitor and contract upon quality,
the choice of service provision often involves a trade oﬀ between cost and quality.
In the present paper, we consider the case where there is a non-trivial trade-oﬀ between cost
and quality and investigate the economic implications of delegating the authority to take the
make-or-buy decision and/or to contract and negotiate with public and private service providers.
We consider a simple framework where a principal delegates the decision and contracting rights
to a politically motivated agency. Our model is broad enough to cover both the case of a
national or local government that delegates to a bureaucratic agency, a department minister,
or a politically motivated NGO, and the case of representative democracy where voters elect a
politician to decide on the service provision. We show that delegation is a powerful instrument to
provide public and private service providers with better incentives and to counter private market
power. Ultimately our model sheeds new light on fundamental issues like optimal provision of
public service, distortion in ressource allocation under incomplete contracting and the advantages
of representative democracy.
We build on the incomplete contracting framework of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) where
a government faces a cost-quality trade oﬀ when it chooses between contracting with a public
or a private service provider. In both cases contracts are incomplete and the service provider’s
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incentives are indirect and come through renegotiation of the contract. The incentives are
therefore in general not optimal and typically stronger (for good and bad) in the private sector.
We extend this framework by endogenizing the outsourcing price; including market power; and,
rational market determined managerial wage formation. However, the main premise of our
analysis - and therefore the main departure from the HSV97 setting - is that we assume that
agents are heterogenous and value the quality of the public service diﬀerently.
The principal’s dual objective is to have high quality service at a low cost. We identify two
eﬀects, which make delegation a powerful tool to achieve these goals. The first eﬀect is the
incentive eﬀect pertaining to renegotiation of the contract with the service provider. Assume
that the principal finds that inhouse provision leads to excessive costs, since the public manager
has insuﬃcient incentives to put eﬀort into reducing cost. Then the principal can delegate the
contract renegotiation to an agency who cares less about the adverse impact on quality. The
agency will be willing to pay the public manager more for implementing cost reductions. The
public manager’s incentive to spend eﬀort on cost reductions is increased in this way, and so
is the payment, he receives in the renegotiation. However, when his base wage is negotiated
initially, the outcome of the renegotiation is foreseen and the principal will make savings on
the manager’s base wage since the manager’s total pay reflects the outside option the maket
for managers oﬀers. The incentive eﬀect of delegation, therefore, eﬀectively shifts part of the
fixed salary towards incentive based pay. Hence, delegation essentially substitutes for an explicit
incentive contract.1 Notice, that the eﬀect depends both on the agency’s higher willingness to
pay and the fact that the total pay of the manager reflects the outside options the market oﬀers
1The following numeric example illustrates the incentive eﬀect: Assume a principal, P, hires a manager, M, to
provide an inhouse service at a fix wage 8. M can invest (non-contractible) at a private cost of 3. P ’s value of the
service is 14 with the investment and 10 without. With an equal split of the renegotiation surplus, M receives
only 2 after investing. Thus, M does not invest.
Imagine P delegates the decision to negotiate with M to an agency, A, that cares more about the investment.
Assume A0s value is 20 with the investment and 10 without. Post-renegotiation now provides M a compensation
of 5 implying that M invests.
With a fixed base salary of 8, P - who pays all the costs - will not delegate since the total cost of 13 (i.e. 8+5)
leaves her with a surplus of 1. Without delegation there is no investment and P ends up with a surplus of 2.
However, rational parties foresee the renegotiation process and A will under delegation oﬀerM a lower base salary
of 6 equal to the original base salary (8) plus cost of investment (3) minus expected outcome of renegotiation (5).
Hence, given rational wage setting and delegation, P ends up with a surplus of 14− 6− 5 = 3 which exceeds the
surplus of 2 from not delegating. The incentive eﬀect of delegation eﬀectively induces stronger incentives through
increasing the incentive part of a public manager’s compensation.
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him.
The second eﬀect is the bargaining eﬀect reflecting that delegation may counter private
market power. Assume that the principal prefers outsourcing because she focuses more on cost
cutting than on quality. Then inhouse provision is not a real threat in the negotiation with a
private firm, and if the firm has market power it will capture part of the surplus associated with
outsourcing: the price will be relatively high. The principal can improve upon the bargaining
situation by delegating to an agency that cares more about quality. Such an agency is more
reluctant to outsource and facing a high price from the private firm, it will not outsource. This
forces the firm to lower the price. The bargaining eﬀect implies, therefore, that delegation is an
eﬀective tool for achieving lower prices from private service providers.2
We trace the implications of these two eﬀects in four diﬀerent cases of delegation and compare
it to our benchmark case of no delegation, where the principal keeps all decision power. The
delegation cases are: mandatory inhouse provision, where service has to be provided inhouse by a
governmental service provider and contracting powers are delegated to an agency; arm’s length
delegation, where both the outsourcing decision and the contracting authority are delegated;
partial delegation, where the principal chooses the type of service provider but delegates the
contract and negotiation powers; and, finally, double delegation, where each decision is delegated
to diﬀerent independent agencies. The diﬀerent modes have diﬀerent virtues but they also
represent diﬀerent institutions. For instance, inhouse provision is mandatory for police services
in most countries. Local or regional elections of mayors where outsourcing is a salient issue
correspond to arm’s length delegation and so does the case where decisions are delegated to a
department minister with full powers or an NGO.
We first focus on the important basic case where cost reductions constitute the overwhelming
motive and the important trade oﬀ related to outsourcing is that costs are lowered but so is
2The following numerical example illustrates the bargaining eﬀect: A given service is worth 15 to P and can be
provided at cost 10 by a public service provider or at cost 4 by a private. The public manager delivers service at a
higher quality and let ∆q > 0 be the diﬀerence. Assume P does not care about the quality. Then P will choose
the private firm and pay 7 for the service, if prices are determined through an equal split of bargaining surplus.
However, assume that P delegates the outsourcing decision to an agency A that values ∆q slightly less than 6. A
prefers inhouse if the private service provider demands a price (slightly) higher than 4 and the private firm thus
oﬀers the service at this price. Hence, the bargaining eﬀect of delegation secures that P gets her prefered mode
of service provision at a lower price.
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quality. This highlights the power of the incentive and bargaining eﬀects in an illustrative way,
since there is no incentive eﬀect under private service provision in this case. The bargaining
eﬀect makes arm’s length delegation better than partial delegation for the principal, when she
prefers outsourcing. When the principal cares more about quality and prefers inhouse provision,
arm’s length delegation is still better than no delegation, but may involve the problem that
the preferred type of agency for dealing with the public manager prefers outsourcing. Partial
delegation is therefore better in some cases. When the preferred agency prefers inhouse provision
itself, partial and arm’s length delegation are equally good for the principal as they both induce
the incentive eﬀect.
In the political interpretation of arm’s length delegation where the principal is the median
voter of the electorate and the agency the elected politician, these results imply that represen-
tative democracy is better for the median voter than direct democracy. However, we wil show
conditions for when limiting the politicians’ powers (i.e. partial delegation) generates even more
welfare.
The principal does not completely internalize the eﬀort cost of the service provider and if
she were to choose the mode of provision it would not necessarily be the socially best. From an
eﬃciency perspective, we show that delegation dominates non-delegation and partial delegation
is weakly better than any other mode of provision except double delegation.3
When quality is the overwhelmingly important objective, the stronger incentives in the pri-
vate sector make outsourcing optimal for any type of principal. In this case the incentive eﬀect
is present under both public and private service provision. The general case is a mixture of
the two simple cases and the general results will depend on which objective is dominant. We
consider the case where cost-reductions are not a minor concern and the outsourcing decision
still involves the cost-quality trade oﬀ even though both kinds of eﬀort are important. The basic
results of delegation from the cost-reduction case bear over to this more general case.
3Double delegation can mimick arm’s length delegation (by delegating both decisions to the same type) and
partial delegation (by delegating the outsourcing decision to a type identical to the principal). Thus, double
delegation is always weakly better for the principal than the other two delegation modes. We are not aware of
any practical examples of double delegation; hence, we include this case as a theoretical exercise that can be used
as an upper benchmark for the other types of delegation.
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More generally, our results shed light upon the scope of delegation as a remedy to miti-
gate incentive problems due to incomplete contracting. The analysis is based on two essential
premises: First, delegation requires the existence of heterogenous preferences. This is a natural
assumption in the area of public service provision, where groups of individuals receive diﬀerent
net benefits from a given public service and may have diﬀerent political preferences. However,
this is not necessarily the case in other areas where incomplete contracting has proven to be im-
portant.4 Second, optimal delegation may require a talented agent with so extreme preferences
that it can be hard to find. Hence, whereas our analysis indicates that strategic delegation is
powerful in public service provision, we do not claim that it can solve all allocation ineﬃciencies
created by contractual incompleteness.
The main distinction between privatization and outsourcing is that the former involves trans-
fer of asset ownership from the government to the private sector, whereas the latter focuses on
the transfer - through contracts - of rights to deliver a service for a limited amount of time.
The theoretical literature has focused on welfare consequences of privatization and outsourcing
focusing on asymmetric information (Laﬀont and Tirole (1991), Schmidt (1996) and Shapiro
and Willig (1993)) political failures (Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Bennedsen (1999)) and
incomplete contracting (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Besley and Ghatak (2001) studies op-
timal ownership structures among two parties that both care about and invest in public projects.
They show that ownership shall be allocated to the part that cares most about the project and
apply this insight to the studies of NGO ownership of public goods.5
All these studies focus on the normative consequences of public and private ownership; how-
ever, they do not provide strong positive explanations of why a self interested government would
accept to outsource public service or privatize government assets. We endogenize a self inter-
ested government’s decision to outsource public service. In this aspect, our study complements
a number of recent theoretical contributions: Debande and Friebel (2004) analyze why govern-
4For instance, we conjecture that delegation is less eﬃcient in improving resource allocation in financial con-
tracting, since there is less heterogeneity in individuals’ valuation of monetary outcomes.
5 In Besley and Ghatak’s analysis a government under inhouse provision always chooses the right investment
level seen from the government’s perspektive but ignore the external eﬀect on the NGO’s utility. In our model -
as in HSV97 - there is no payoﬀ externality; however, the government cannot - without delegation - implement
the optimal investment levels due to that public managers have too weak incentives.
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ments engage in mass privatization; Börner (2006) studies why governments implement political
reforms; and, Ellman (2006) focusses on when a government’s loss of control reduces its respon-
siveness to public opinion which can reduce the public’s political involvement. We depart from
all these studies by analyzing how strategic delegation improves the government’s position in
pre and post contractual bargaining situations.6
Empirical studies of privatization has to a large extent focused on how increased competition
has aﬀected the cost of maintaining facilities and providing public and private services (see
e.g. Vickers and Yarrow (1988), World Bank (1995) and (1997), and the survey by Megginson
and Netter (1999)). A growing number of studies address explicitly the determinants of local
government’s make-or-buy decision. Lopez de Silanaes et.al. (1997) documents the existence of
important political motives that aﬀect the make-or-buy decision at the county level in US. Brown
and Potoski (2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2005) show the importance of transaction costs in
contracting when local governments decide on outsourcing or inhouse provision of public services.
The latter study explicitly develops a measure contracting diﬃculty and shows that it is strongly
correlated with keeping service provision inhouse in US municipalities.
Our model focuses on the trade oﬀ between cost and quality of service provision. We believe
that this trade oﬀ is essential in many kind of governmental services. The quality shading
hypothesis argues that quality may deteriorate when service production is transferred to the
private sector (Jensen and Stonecash, 2005). There are no systematic evidence for a general
quality shading ; however, there are some indications that it is a concern in areas where it is
diﬃcult to make rigorous and enforceable contracts upon service quality. Hartley (2004) and
Fredland (2004) analyzes provision of combat and support functions to sovereign governments
by private companies. The studies conclude that there are substantial potential cost saving from
outsourcing military activities but their economic role will be limited due to contractual hazards.
There are a number of studies that link ownership structures of hospitals to the quality of the
delivered health care (a.o. Sloan et al. 1998, Devereaux et.al. 2002 and Deber 2002) where
the ultimate measure of quality is likelihood of death. Similarly, Crampton and Starfield (2004)
6Our paper is also related to the large literature on central bank independency following Rogoﬀ (1985). The
focus in central bank delegation is on the ability to commit to a certain future policy.
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discusses the quality eﬀects of private provision of primary health service.7
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we focus on non contractible investment
in cost saving having an adverse impact on quality. We set up the basic model and analyze
as a benchmark incentives to outsource given delegation is not possible. Then we compare
resource allocation and incentives to outsource under four types of delegation: mandatory inhouse
provision, arm’s length, partial and double delegation. Section 3 focuses on non contractible
investment in quality improvement. Section 4 combines the two previous sections and analyzes
the power of delegation under the existence non contractible investment in both cost reduction
and quality improvement. Section 5 concludes.
2 One task: Cost reduction
We will first consider the case, where the crucial task faced in service production is a reduction
of cost. We assume that cost reductions involve a classic trade oﬀ: When the total cost of
producing the service is reduced so is the quality of the final service. We begin this section
with setting up the basic framework of inhouse provision and outsourcing of a public service
when investment or eﬀort spent in cost reduction is non contractible. This part consists of a
simplified version of the model developed in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). We extend their
model by endogenizing managerial wage formation and by analysing a principal’s incentives to
outsource under diﬀerent market structures when delegation is not possible. We use this as a
building block for our analysis of how optimal delegation aﬀects ressource allocation. Finally,
we investigate the welfare consequences of delegation.
The principal (e.g. a local government) provides a service, which can be produced inhouse
or outsourced. In both cases, the service provider - the public manager or the firm - performs
cost reducing eﬀort, ec, at a private cost of 12e
2
c . The eﬀort results in plans, which may or may
not be implemented. Eﬀort is observable by both parties but non-contractible8. The total costs
7Some studies have investigated the quality eﬀects of outsourcing garbage collection (a.o. McDavid (2002)) an
area where outsourcing generally reduces cost and frequently increase quality.
8To be specific, we assume that the service provider’s investment in cost reduction is observable but not
verifiable to third parties, i.e. it cannot be written into contracts that are enforceable ex post. This is a standard
assumption in the incomplete contracting literature (Hart 1995). For a discussion of this assumption we refer to
(Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999).
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of producing the service consists of renumeration of the manager plus other costs. If the cost
reduction plans are implemented, the non-managerial cost of producing the service is lowered
from C0 > 0 to
C (ec) = C0 − ec. (1)
If the principal produces inhouse, she bears the total costs consisting of C (ec) plus renumeration
of the manager. In case of outsourcing, the firm bears the cost. We assume that the firm is
owned by its manager so there is no managerial wage cost for the firm.
If the plans are implemented, the quality of the service will be reduced to
Q (ec) = Q0 − θec. (2)
The deterioation of quality is the side eﬀect of implementing the cost reduction plans. Depending
of the type of service and technical issues, this eﬀect may be more or less severe, which is
determined by the parameter θ ≥ 0. The principal is interested in high quality but dislikes
paying for the service. When quality is Q and expenditures on the service are Y, the principal’s
utility is
V (Q,Y ) = φpQ− Y (3)
where φp ≥ 0 is the weight the principal puts on quality.
The gross gain from investing in cost reduction is
s(ec, φp, θ) =
¡
1− θφp
¢
ec. (4)
As is clear from this expression, cost reducing eﬀort only gives a positive gross surplus if φp <
1
θ .
2.1 No delegation
We first consider the base line case, where neither authority to decide on outsourcing and perform
the initial contracting nor the authority to renegotiate can be delegated by the principal.
2.1.1 Inhouse provision
Under inhouse provision the principal hires a manager at the competitive market for managers
and pays him a wage w. When hired, the manager spends eﬀort, ec, resulting in plans. With
8
total income I, and eﬀort level, ec, his utility is
um = I − 1
2
e2c . (5)
Since eﬀort is non-contractible, the manager has no direct incentive to perform it. However,
after eﬀort is performed (and the associated utility cost is sunk for the manager), the parties
can renegotiate his contract and decide whether to implement the plans or not. At that point in
time, the plans are tangible and it is possible to write a contract specifying that they should be
implemented. If negotiations break down, the principal can replace the manager, but only half
of the gross gains can be realized, since the new manager does not have the detailed knowledge
and human capital of the old manager.9
As the principal can recoup half of the gross surplus if the manager is fired, the gains from
renegotiation consist of the other half: 12s(ec, φp, θ), which is split evenly so the manager’s
income is w+ 14s(ec, φp, θ).When choosing eﬀort, the manager foresees the renegotiation, so his
optimizing choice is
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
1− θφp
4
(6)
if φp < 1/θ and zero otherwise.
The wage w makes the manager indiﬀerent between taking the job and going for his outside
option, which we normalize to 0.We deviate from the wage setting in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny by
assuming that the parties have rational expectations and foresee the upcoming renegotiation.10
Therefore the manager’s wage fulfills
w = 0− 1
4
s
¡
einc
¡
φp
¢
, φp, θ
¢
+
1
2
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢2 .
9That exactly half of the gross gains can be recouped is inessential for the qualitative results, but it simplifies
formulas nicely.
10Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997 assume that the public manager receives a fixed wage weakly larger than his
outside option. Hence, the government does not foresee the renegotiation implying that the manager ends up with
a total compensation strictly larger than his outside option. We believe that a rational government recognizes
that it can lower the fixed part of the manager’s remuneration below the relevant reservation wage, because both
manager and government know that additional payment will follow in the renegotiation process.
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny briefly discuss the possibility that the manager oﬀers the government some of his
post contractual rent but catagorize such actions as corruption.
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When φp < 1/θ, so eﬀort is positive, the total expenditure for the principal is
Y in
¡
φp
¢
= C0 − einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
+ w +
1
4
s
¡
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
, φp, θ
¢
(7)
= C0 −
1− θφp
4
+
1
2
µ
1− θφp
4
¶2
and the principal’s utility from in-house provision is
uin = φp
µ
Q0 − θ
1− θφp
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− θφp
4
+
1
2
µ
1− θφp
4
¶2!
. (8)
When φp ≥ 1/θ, i.e. eﬀort is zero, the total expenditure is just C0 and the principal’s utility is
φpQ0 − C0.
For later comparison we find the first best level of eﬀort, i.e. the eﬀort level that maximises
the net surplus between the manager and the principal,
N(ec, φp, θ) = s(ec, φp, θ)−
1
2
e2c =
¡
1− φpθ
¢
ec −
1
2
e2c (9)
For φp < 1/θ it is
e∗c
¡
φp, θ
¢
= 1− θφp (10)
otherwise it is zero.
To sum up, the contractual incompleteness lead to ineﬃciency since the public manager’s
eﬀort level is too low compared to first best. The reason is that the renegotiation provides the
manager with too weak incentives, since he only internalizes a quarter of the total value created
by his action.
2.1.2 Outsourcing
When the service provision is outsourced, the principal and a private firm conclude a contract
stipulating that the firm produces the service for the price p0 and bears the associated costs.
The contract can be renegotiated, but it cannot be terminated prematurely. Then the private
firm exerts non-contracteble eﬀort, ec which results in plans for cost reduction. At this point,
the parties may renegotiate the contract. If negotiations break down, the firm owns the plans
and decides whether cost reductions will be implemented. This is the crucial diﬀerence to
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inhouse provision. Since the firm bears costs and is paid p0 regardless of whether the plans are
implemented or not, it will wish to implement the cost reductions.
One may wonder whether the principal would be interested in paying the firm for not im-
plementing the cost reduction. If φpθ < 1, then although the principal is hurt, she is not willing
to pay the firm the potential cost savings for not implementing the cost reduction. In this case,
the renegotiation will have no eﬀect and the firm will just implement the cost reduction. For
θφp ≤ 1, therefore, the total expenditure for the principal under outsourcing is Y o = p0. The
firm’s optimal choice is
eoc = 1. (11)
If, on the other hand, 1 < φpθ, then the quality reduction hurts the principal so much that she is
willing to pay more than the potential cost reduction in order to avoid it. Assuming - as above
- that the parties split the bargaining surplus 50:50, then such a payment would imply that
the firm in fact gets even larger benefit from eﬀort directed at cost reductions, since now the
marginal payoﬀ is 1+
φpθ−1
2 . The optimal choice of cost reducing eﬀort would be ec = 1+
φpθ−1
2 ,
and this would make outsourcing unattractive for the principal. Below we show that outsourcing
is only chosen when θφp ≤ 37 and we will therefore not pursue the case where θφp > 1 further.
The utilities to the firm and the principal from outsourcing are
uf = p0 − C0 +
1
2
and uo = φpQ0 − θφp − p0. (12)
Comparing (6), (10) and (11), we have that
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
≤ e∗c
¡
φp, θ
¢
< eoc . (13)
Cost reducing eﬀort is larger under outsourcing than under inhouse provision. While the public
manager has no direct interest in cost reductions and takes into account that they hurt the
principal, the firm has a strong motive to reduce cost, since it pays the cost. Outsourcing
therefore involves a tradeoﬀ, the cost of producing the service falls but it is at the expense of
quality.
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2.1.3 Incentives to outsource
We envision outsourcing through a bidding process, where the lowest bidder wins the contract.
The winning price depends on the competitive environment. If the principal is a large actor in
the market and the market is competitive, it is reasonable to assume that the price will equal
the competitive price, where the firm earns no excess profit and the principal reaps the whole
surplus from outsourcing.11 However if competition is weak and the firms are able to collude the
outcome will not be competitive. If, for instance, there are many local principals facing one large
monopolistic firm, the firm has significant bargaining power. If the principal invites tenders,
the private firm will only need to submit a bid, which exactly makes the principal indiﬀerent
between outsourcing and producing in-house. In this case the private monopoly will reap the
surplus from outsourcing.
The joint surplus of the principal and the firm from outsourcing is
Ω
¡
φp, θ
¢
= uo + uf −
¡
uin + 0
¢
where the zero is the value of the firm’s outside option. Inserting gives
Ω
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
½
1
32
¡
3− 7θφp
¢ ¡
3 + θφp
¢
if φp ≤ 1θ
1
2
¡
1− 2θφp
¢
if φp >
1
θ
(14)
We will assume that the parties split the surplus, so that the firm’s share is γ (and the
principal’s share is (1− γ)). Thus γ parameterizes the degree of market power: If γ = 1, the
firm reaps all surplus - the monopoly case - if γ = 0 the principal reaps all surplus - the perfectly
competitive case.
The principal’s utility from outsourcing is therefore
uo = (1− γ)Ω+ uin (15)
from which it is clear that the principal only outsources when the joint surplus is positive. This
leads to
11This will in principle also be the consequence if the principal holds some standard auction, for instance an
English auction, and there are at least two bidders who do not coordinate their bids.
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Proposition 1 Under no delegation, a principal of type φp outsources if and only if
φp ≤ G (θ) ≡
3
7θ
. (16)
The Proposition provides a number of interesting, empirically relevant insights into govern-
ments’ outsourcing behaviour:
First, outsourcing is a two-edged sword. The private firm will spend more eﬀort making cost
reductions possible but this is at the cost of lower quality. This trade oﬀ leads principals who
care less for quality, to outsource, while principals who care more for quality, tend to choose
inhouse production. The higher is θ, the more severe is the trade-oﬀ and the smaller is the
cut-oﬀ value of φp. Hence, outsourcing takes place, ceterius paribus, when the principal does not
value the benefits of the service so much and when cost reductions do not hurt quality so much.
Second, Proposition 1 yields that the outsourcing decision is independent of the competi-
tiveness of the market - γ does not enter in condition (16). While perhaps surprising at first
sight, the reason is straightforward: Outsourcing takes place when the surplus from outsourcing
is positive, this is independent of how the surplus is split. Market power does not aﬀect the
existence of the surplus, it only aﬀects how it is split.
The outsourcing price, p0, is determined such that the firm receives the fraction γ of the
outsourcing surplus, Ω. The surplus, and therefore also the price, depends on the principal’s
preference for quality. Using (8), (14) and (15), we find the principal’s utility from outsourcing:
uo
¡
φp, θ
¢
= φpQ0 − θφp −C0 +
1
2
− γ
32
¡
3− 7θφp
¢ ¡
θφp + 3
¢
. (17)
Using (12) we find that the price equals
p0 = Y
o ¡φp, θ¢ = C0 − 12 + γ32 ¡3− 7θφp¢ ¡θφp + 3¢ , (18)
which decreases in φp for φp ≤ 37θ . A principal, who values quality more, is more hurt by the
quality reductions following the private firm’s cost reductions. This lowers the price the firm
receives. The principal’s preferences for quality has a price eﬀect.
Notice, that when the principal is of type φp = G (θ) =
3
7θ , the outsourcing surplus, Ω
¡
φp, θ
¢
is zero. Such a principal finds that the large cost reductions implemented by the firm hurts
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quality so much, that she is of the brink of preferring inhouse production. Facing a principal
of type G (θ) , the firm is therefore only able to get a contract if its payoﬀ γΩ
¡
φp, θ
¢
is zero -
indendently of the market structure, γ. This is true even when the private firm is a monopolist.
2.2 Delegation
The benchmark analysis above showed that when incentives and bargaining outcomes are de-
termined through renegotiation, the public manager’s eﬀort choice and the outsourcing price
do depend on the principal’s preferences. Hence, if a principal could “misrepresent” her pref-
erences, she may be able to obtain less distortion in ressource allocation and/or a better price
of the service. One eﬀective way to acheive such strategic misrepresentation is to delegate the
authority to outsource and the responsibility of contract negotiation to an independent agency.
There are multiple decisions involved in contracting and negotiating with private and public
service providers; thus, in theory there are multiple decisions that can be delegated indepen-
dently of each other and to independent agencies. To structure the following analysis we divide
all decisions into two categories: First, the outsourcing-decision covers the decision to choose
between a private or a public service provider, and, second, the contract and negotiation decision
covers responsibility to hire, contract and negotiate with the service provider after the form of
provision has been decided. Each of these decisions can be decided by the principal or delegated
to an agency.
We categorize the four possible cases as follows: Under Mandatory inhouse provision out-
sourcing is not an option and the principal delegates the contract and negotiation decision to an
independent agency. Under Arms’ length delegation the principal delegates both the outsourcing
and the contract and negotiation decisions to one independent agency. Under Partial delegation
the principal delegates the contract and negotiation decision to an independent agency but does
not delegate the outsourcing decision. Finally, double delegation, is the most advanced form of
delegation where the two decisions are delegated to two independent agencies.
In the following, we investigate how each of these delegation modes aﬀects incentives to
outsource and the cost and quality levels of the delivered service. The principal can choose
among agencies, who also are politically motivated and care about the quality and the cost of
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the delivered service. As before principal φp values quality with the parameter φp. The agency is
chosen from a group of potential agencies, whose preferences for the quality, characterized by φa,
diﬀer. We will assume that the population is suﬃciently heterogeneous that for any positive φa
it is possible to find an agency with φa.We exclude the possibility of negative φa, so we exclude
the existence of malevolent agencies who benefit from public service beeing of low quality. It
would in fact make the analysis simpler, if we did not impose this - reasonable - restriction.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the framework is general enough to have several inter-
pretations. In bureaucratic delegation the principal is the government and the agency is an
independent service provision agency that negotiate with private and public service providers
and choose for each type of service between inhouse provision or outsourcing. Alternatively, one
could conceive the agency as a department minister with independent powers or a politically
motivated NGO.
The second interpretation is one of representative democracy. In this setting it is assumed
that outsourcing is a decisive issue in elections. This is most likely to be the case in elections to
local governments or municipalities where outsourcing of the core services of the welfare state
like elderly or health services are topical issues. The group of voters in the election are principals
and the median voter (characterized by φp) is the decisive principal. We assume that a politician
cannot commit to a policy before the election so political promises prior to an election are cheap
talk. The elected politician is going to maximize her utility and voters realize this. The election
therefore becomes a game of delegation for the median voter.12 The median voter then elects a
government with preferences characterized by φa.
2.2.1 Delegation under mandatory inhouse provision
First we consider the case where outsourcing is not an option, but the principal may delegate
the responsibility for the service provision to an agency. The agency has authority to hire the
public manager and renegotiate the contract. The service could be e.g. primary school provision,
hospital service or elderly care in a country where the law prescribes that municipalities must
provide inhouse provision of such service. Principal φ0ps utility when agency φa chooses inhouse
12As is seen below, the median voter is well-defined.
15
provision is
vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
= φp (Q0 − θemc (φa, θ))− Y in (φa, θ) ,
which gives
vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
= φp
µ
Q0 − θ
1− θφa
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− θφa
4
+
1
2
µ
1− θφa
4
¶2!
, (19)
for φa < 1/θ and φpQ0−C0 otherwise. The principal’s preferred agency maximizes vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
among all agencies φa ≥ 0.13 This gives
Proposition 2 Under mandatory inhouse provision, the principal’s preferred agency, φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
,
is given by
φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if 0 ≤ φp ≤ 34
1
θ ,
4φp − 3θ if
3
4
1
θ ≤ φp ≤
1
θ ,
any φa >
1
θ if
1
θ < φp.
(20)
The Proposition reflects that the principal takes advantage of the incentive eﬀect of delega-
tion. When the principal chooses agency, she bears in mind that too little eﬀort is spent by the
public manager on cost reductions, since the manager only internalizes a quarter of the gross
surplus, cf. (6) and (10). The principal counters this problem by choosing an agency who cares
less than the principal about quality, as it is easily checked that
φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
< φp for φp ≤
1
θ
.
When the public manager renegotiates with the agency, the surplus from cost reductions is
higher than if renegotiations were with the principal, since the agency values quality less and is
more favorable to cost reductions. The manager, who receives part of the surplus, therefore gets
a higher marginal pay from putting more eﬀort into cost reductions and respond by making more
eﬀort. While the principal likes the higher eﬀort, she dislikes the increased pay to the manager.
However, this is partly oﬀset in the initial contracting. Recall that the public manager is hired at
the competitive market for managers, so his total pay will cover his eﬀort cost plus his outside
option. When signing the initial contract with the agency, he rationally foresees the income
13Here and in the sequel, it is straightforward to check that the second order condition for maximum is fulfilled.
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from the renegotiation and is willing to accept a lower base wage. Hence, the principal in eﬀect
only ends up covering the manager’s extra eﬀort cost. The incentive eﬀect implies that a larger
fraction of the manager’s pay is related to incentives. Delegation, therefore, substitutes for a
formal incentive contract.14
The incentive eﬀect improves improves eﬃciency. In fact, we have that
emc
µ
4φp −
3
θ
, θ
¶
=
1− θ
¡
4φp − 3θ
¢
4
= 1− θφp = e∗c
¡
φp, θ
¢
,
for 3/(4θ) ≤ φp ≤ 1/θ, so in these cases delegation can oﬀset all distortions following from
contractual incompleteness under mandatory inhouse provision. Principals with lower φp find
that the boundary condition, 0 ≤ φa binds. Optimal delegation would require that the principal
delegates to so extreme types, that they cannot be found in the population. Hence, although
delegation improves the situation for the principal in this case, it does not solve all allocation
problems. Principals with φp > 1/θ, prefer no cost reduction at all, and this can be achieved by
choosing any type of agency fulfilling φa > 1/θ.
Delegation is a powerfull instrument; however, as discussed in the introduction the analysis
also highlights why delegation does not solve all problems related to postcontractual renegotia-
tions. First, as we saw it might be the case that suﬃciently extreme agents capable of negotiating
with the service provider do not exist. Secondly, the premise for delegation is that agents are
heterogeneous and have diﬀerent preferences on the trade oﬀ between cost and quality. This is
a natural assumption in the context a local bus route, an elderly home or other kind of public
service. However, incomplete contracting has also proved to be an important modelling tool in
areas where such variation is not present (see Hart 1995), which limits the ability of delegation
to circumvent ressource allocation ineﬃciencies.
14Notice, it is crucial for delegation to work that the renegotiation outcome is foreseen at the time of the initial
contracting with the service provider. As noticed above this is the main diﬀerence between our approach and
the HSV97 analysis. In their framework, delegation would not improve ressource allocation because the service
providers renumeration does not include the expected pay from renegotiation. Whereas delegation could improve
incentives in their analysis it would be too costly for the principal and she will choose not to delegate as illustrated
in the example in footnote (1).
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2.2.2 Arm’s Length Delegation
As discussed in the Introduction, delegation can be an institutional choice as in the case of
representative democracy, where voters delegate to an elected politician. However, it can also
be the only feasible arrangement, since political leaderships necessarily have to delegate many
tasks to subordinates, including the authority to decide on some service provision tasks. To
cover these settings, we begin with the case where the principal delegates to an agency, who
both decides on the mode of service provision and is responsible for hiring and negotiating with
the service provider.
Under arm’s length delegation, the principal is aware that agencies with 0 ≤ φa ≤ G (θ) will
outsource, while those with G (θ) ≤ φa will choose inhouse provision.15
Principal φ0ps utility when agency φa outsources is
vout
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
= φp (Q0 − θ)−
µ
C0 −
1
2
+
γ
32
(3− 7θφa) (θφa + 3)
¶
(21)
and the most preferred agency maximizes this among those who outsource. The most pre-
ferred among those who prefer inhouse provision maximizes vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
(as given in (19)).
Straightforward maxization and comparison of the indirect utilities under inhouse provision and
outsourcing respectively gives:
Proposition 3 Under arm’s length delegation, the outsourcing decision is the same as under
no delegation. Principal φ0ps preferred agency, φ
al
a
¡
φp, θ
¢
, and the outsourcing decision is given
by:
φala
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
G (θ) if 0 ≤ φp ≤ G (θ) outsourcing,
G (θ) if G (θ) ≤ φp ≤ 2G (θ) inhouse,
4φp − 3θ if 2G (θ) ≤ φp ≤ 1/θ inhouse,
any φa >
1
θ if
1
θ < φp inhouse.
Principals with low preference for quality, who prefer outsourcing, take advantage of the
bargaining eﬀect and delegate to an agency of type φa = G (θ). This agency cares more about
quality than the principal and is at the brink of preferring inhouse provision. When contracting
15An agency with φa = G (θ) is indiﬀerent between inhouse provision and outsourcing. We assume that in this
case the agency chooses the principal’s most preferred option. Otherwise, the principal could delegate to a type
G (θ)− ε if she preferred outsourcing and type G (θ) + ε if she preferred inhouse provision, where ε is vanishingly
small.
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with the private firm this agency is a tough negotiator, since it finds the firm’s expected cost
savings problematic for quality. The outsourcing surplus between this agency and the firm is
negligble (zero actually) and the outsourcing price is therefore as low as possible.
The incentive eﬀect plays no role here, since the firm will just implement the cost savings
without further renegotiation. Principals, who prefer inhouse provision, take advantage of the
incentive eﬀect, just as they did under mandatory inhouse provision, and delegate to agents,
who care less about quality than the principal. However, principals with intermediate valuations
of quality, where G (θ) ≤ φp ≤ 2G (θ) run into the problem that the preferred agency under
mandatory inhouse provision now wishes to outsource. Hence, the principal has to modify the
choice of agency to a type who just chooses inhouse provision. This still gives an incentive eﬀect,
but not so much as the principal would have wished for. Principals with even higher preference
for quality do not encounter this problem, they can freely choose the most preferred agency
under inhouse provision and stay confident that this agency also prefers inhouse provision.
Arm’s lenght delegation does not change the outsourcing decision: Principals delegate to an
agency, who makes the same decision on outsourcing as the principal would herself. The reason is
that the bargaining eﬀect and the incentive eﬀect partly oﬀset each other: The bargaining eﬀect
induces the principal to choose an agency who values quality more than herself, the incentive
eﬀect induces her to choose an agency who values quality less. Consider a principal of type
G (θ) + ε, where ε is very small. Even though she could get (almost) as good a bargain with
the private firm as agency G (θ) , she prefers inhouse provision under no delegation. When she
delegates, she will, therefore, not be interested in delegating to agency G (θ) who outsources.
Similarly, principal G (θ) − ε prefers outsourcing under no delegation even though she herself
would induce (almost) the same incentives for the public manager as the lowest type agency,
who chooses inhouse production, type G (θ). Type G (θ) − ε will therefore not be interested
in delegating to an agency, who chooses inhouse provision. The result is that the outsourcing
decision is not changed by arm’s length delegation.
Since the bargaining eﬀect and the incentive eﬀect go in opposite directions, principals prefer
agencies, who are closer to being indiﬀerent between outsourcing and inhouse provision than the
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principal herself is. In the context of representative democracy, where the provision of public
goods is the salient issue, this implies that voters vote for politicians who are more moderate
than themselves.
The principal’s optimal agency has preferences diﬀerent from the principal for almost all
principals (if φp < 1/θ). In the context of democracy Proposition 3 has the important implication
that representative democracy is better for the median principal than direct democracy. We also
note that a principal’s preferred agency is weakly increasing in φp. If one imagines that diﬀerent
voters in the electorate has diﬀerent φp, this implies that the preferred agency of the voter with
the median value of φp is a Condorcet winner.
2.2.3 Partial delegation
Arm’s length delegation provides the principal with the strategic benefits of delegation. However,
as we saw the principal may encounter the problem that the preferred agency under - say -
inhouse provision prefers to outsource. This limits the principal’s options and the principal
has to choose a second best agency of type φa = G (θ). The principal can avoid this problem
by taking the outsourcing decision herself. We have already considered the case of mandatory
inhouse provision above, now we focus on the case where the principal first decides on the mode
of provision, contracts with the service provider and then delegates the authority to renegotiate
with the service provider to an agency. We call this partial delegation.
When the private market is characterized by some market power it is not an option for
the principal to specify that the agency shall outsource and leave the price negotiations to the
agency - at least this is a very bad option. If the agency is forced to outsource, the outsourcing
surplus is infinite and the price undetermined as the model is specified. This reflects that in
reality the agency would fall prey to the monopoly power of the firm(s). We therefore consider
the case where the principal herself conducts negotiations with the firm if outsourcing is chosen.
Both parties understand that the alternative for the principal is to choose inhouse provision.
When the mode of provision is chosen - and if outsourcing occurs, the firm’s price is set - the
principal chooses the best agency to conduct the renegotiation. The best agency then depends
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on the chosen mode of provision.16 In the price negotiations with the private firm both parties
realize this.
From Proposition 2 we know that if the principal chooses inhouse provision and φp ≤ 34
1
θ ,
then φa = 0 and ec = 1. The utility to the principal in this case is
vin
¡
0|φp, θ
¢
= φp
µ
Q0 −
1
4
θ
¶
− C0 +
7
32
.
If, on the other hand, outsourcing is chosen, then ec = 1, and the utility to the principal and
the firm respectively is given by uo and uf as given in (12). Hence, the outsourcing surplus is
Ωˆ
¡
φp, θ
¢
= uo + uf −
¡
vin
¡
0|φp, θ
¢
+ 0
¢
=
3
32
¡
3− 8θφp
¢
. (22)
This is positive if φp ≤ 38
1
θ . For φp ≥
3
4
1
θ the optimal agency under inhouse provision is not
φa = 0, but it is straightforward to check that the outsourcing surplus is also negative in this
case. This gives
Proposition 4 Under partial delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing if and only if
φp ≤ H (θ) ≡
3
8
1
θ
. (23)
If outsourcing is chosen, any agency is optimal for the principal. If inhouse provision is chosen,
the principal prefers an agency of type φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
as given in (20).
Under partial delegation outsourcing is less likely than under no delegation and arm’s length
delegation, since H (θ) < G (θ). The reason is that partial delegation enables principals of
types close to G (θ) to specify inhouse provision and choose an agency who gives an optimal
incentive eﬀect. This agency would prefer to outsource if it had the opportunity, and this choice
is therefore not an option for the principal under arm’s length delegation. When the principal
specifies inhouse provision, the situation is as under mandatory inhouse provision. Hence, the
principal can take full advantage of the incentive eﬀect under partial delegation. The bargaining
eﬀect, on the other hand, vanishes under partial delegation since the initial contracting with the
16 In fact, any agency is optimal when outsourcing is chosen, since there will be no renegotiation in this case,
as discussed above.
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firm is done by the principal herself. Still the improved prospects under inhouse provision makes
the principal herself a better negotiator with the firm allthough not as good as the agency, who
is at the brink of choosing inhouse provision. All in all outsourcing is a less attractive option for
principals with φp in the vicinity of G (θ) . Principals with low preference for quality still prefer
outsourcing, for them the strong cost reductions made by the firm are still attractive.
2.2.4 Double-delegation
Our final delegation mode is double-delegation, where the principal delegates the outsourcing
decision to agency a1 and the authority to hire and conduct the post-contractual renegotiation
to another agency, a2.
For agency a1, the principal’s choice of agency a2 is then given, and if he chooses inhouse
provision his utility is vin
¡
φa2 |φa1 , θ
¢
(as given in (19)), while the utility if he chooses outsourcing
is vout
¡
φa2 |φa1 , θ
¢
(from (21)). Inserting, we find that inhouse provision is chosen by a1 if
φa1 ≥
3
8θ
(1− γ) + (1 + 7γ)
8
φa2 (24)
If a1 and a2 are chosen such that (24) is fulfilled with equality, the outsourcing surplus between
the firm and a1 is zero, and the outsourcing price therefore equals zero. If the principal wishes
to outsource, she should take advantage of this. The principal’s utility from outsourcing will
then be (again using 21)
v˜out
¡
φp, θ
¢
= φp (Q0 − θ)−
µ
C0 −
1
2
¶
If inhouse provision is chosen, the optimal choice of agency a2 maximizes vin
¡
φa2 |φp, θ
¢
. The
solution is φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
as given in Proposition 2. Inserting into the principal’s utility function
and comparing with v˜out
¡
φp, θ
¢
leads to
Proposition 5 Under double delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing if and only if
φp ≤ H (θ) ≡
3
8
1
θ
(25)
In this case, the principal chooses a1 and a2 fulfilling (24) and reaps the outsourcing surplus.
Otherwise the principal chooses inhouse provision and she prefers an agency a2 of type φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
as given in (20).
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Hence, the outsourcing decision and the delegation under inhouse provision are the same
under double-delegation and partial delegation. However, when outsourcing is preferred by the
principal, she can take advantage of the possibility of delegating the outsourcing decision to a
type who is just at the brink of choosing inhouse provision and reap all of the outsourcing surplus.
It is intuitive that the outsourcing decision is the same under the two institutions: Under partial
delegation the outsourcing surplus is zero for principal φp = H (θ) . She is therefore indiﬀerent
between outsourcing or not, and the firm’s total payment equals zero. Clearly, she can not
improve upon this situation by delegating this decision to an agent.
2.2.5 Eﬃciency
The principal does not directly internalize the eﬀort cost of the service provider, so the outcome
is not necessarily maximizing joint surplus. In this section, we consider eﬃciency, by which we
understand the sum of utility of the principal and the service provider, the net surplus as given
in (9), which we restate for convenience17
N(ec, φp, θ) = s(ec, φp, θ)−
1
2
e2c =
¡
1− φpθ
¢
ec −
1
2
e2c .
The first best level of eﬀort maximizes the net surplus and is e∗c = 1− θφp, for φp ≤ 1/θ cf
(10) .
We are interested in understanding which institution for allocation of authority creates most
surplus from the provision of the service. Figure 1 depicts the net surplus as a function of φp for
the case where the quality reduction parameter, θ, equals one, and the market power parameter,
γ, euqals a half. First best is the solid grey curve; no delegation is the solid black line which has
a kink at φp = G(θ); arm’s length outsourcing is given by the combination of the solid black
line for φp ≤ G(θ) and the dashed black line for φp ≥ G(θ); mandatory inhouse provision is the
dashed grey line; and, finally, partial delegation and double delegation are the dotted line that
combine the solid black line for φp ≤ H (θ) with the dashed grey line for φp ≥ H (θ).
Figure 1 shows that arm’s length, partial and double delegation (weakly) dominate no del-
egation, and are strictly better when the service is produced inhouse. When the service is
17We hesitate in defining the principal’s and the service provider’s joint surplus as welfare, since this is only
true when the principal internalises all interest in the society but the service provider’s.
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outsourced, the eﬀort level is chosen by the firm without regard to any renegotioation. Thus,
the eﬀort level and joint surplus are the same whether there is delegation or not. Under inhouse
production there is delegation to an agency, which cares less about quality. This yields stronger
incentives for the public manager to perform cost reducing eﬀort and this increases the joint
surplus.
The Figure also demonstrates that partial and double delegation are the most eﬃcient modes.
They have the advantage over mandatory inhouse provision that the benefits from outsourcing
are reaped for low φp and they have the advantage over arm’s length outsourcing that the
principal needs not worry that the preferred agency under inhouse provision cares so little about
quality that it prefers to outsource. Under arm’s length outsourcing, the principal modifies the
choice of agency when φp is close to G (θ) in order to ensure that the agency chooses inhouse
provision.
Finally, the Figure illustrates that full eﬃciency can only be acheived for high φp. These
types of principals have the option to delegate to an agency who cares suﬃciently less about
quality that the public manager can be induced to choose the first best level of eﬀort. Partial
and double delegation allow this for a larger range of φp than arm’s lenght.
In the following proposition we rank the diﬀerent institutions according to the net surplus
generated and we show that the intuition provided by Figure 1 carries over to the more general
case of .θ,≥ 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1]. The proof of the proposition is straightforward: For each institution,
we can find the induced eﬀort level (using ec = 1 whenever there is outsourcing and equation
(6) when there is inhouse provision together with the φa of the chosen agency). This eﬀort level
is then inserted into N
¡
ec, φp, θ
¢
. Remembering that H(θ) ≡ 38θ <
3
7θ ≡ G(θ), we have:
Proposition 6 Eﬃciency of institutions for allocation of authority:
a) Delegation improves service provision: For any φp ≤ 1θ , Arm’s Length, Partial and Double
Delegation give at least as high surplus as No Delegation. For G (θ) < φp <
1
θ all types of
delegation give strictly higher surplus than No Delegation.
b) For φp ≤ H(θ) all institutions (except Mandatory Inhouse Provision) lead to outsourcing
and are equally good. For H(θ) < φp ≤ G(θ) only Arm’s Length, Double and No Delegation lead
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to outsourcing.
c) Partial and Double Delegation yield at least as high surplus as any other institution and
if H(θ) < φp ≤ 2G(θ) they yield strictly higher surplus than No Delegation and Arm’s Length
Delegation.
d) First best can be achieved if and only if 2H(θ) ≤ φp. If 1θ ≤ φp all institutions lead to
first best. If 2G(θ) ≤ φp then any type of delegation leads to first best. If 2H(θ) ≤ φp < 2G(θ),
then Partial, Double and Mandatory inhouse provision lead to first best.
2.2.6 The principal’s ranking
The diﬀerent institutions for allocating authority give the principal diﬀerent options. Suppose
the principal could chose the institution, which one would she choose? It it straightforward
that any type of delegation is (weakly) better for the principal than non-delegation. Under
delegation it is an option for the principal to choose a type equal to herself, thus mimicking
non-delegation. Whenever she does something diﬀerent, it is because it gives her higher utility.
By similar replication arguments, we notice that double delegation must be weakly prefered to
other kinds of delegation and that partial delegation is (weakly) better for the principal than
mandatory inhouse provision.18
The comparison between the two more realistic cases of partial delegation and arm’s length
delegation is more involved. Partial delegation has the advantage that the pricipal needs not
worry that the agency may outsource, when the principal is not interested in this, and so the
principal can choose from a wider array of agencies and take full advantage of the incentive
eﬀect, when she prefers inhouse provision. Arm’s length delegation, on the other hand, has the
advantage, that when the principal prefers outsourcing, she can use the bargaining eﬀect and
reap the whole surplus from outsourcing. From Proposition 4 it is clear that outsourcing only is
better for the principal than inhouse provision with the optimal agency when φp ≤ H (θ) . From
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we know that the choice of agency is the same under arm’s
length delegation and partial delegation when 2G (θ) ≤ φp and that the all modes lead to the
18Remember from footnote 3 that Double delegation can mimick both arm’s length delegation and partial dele-
gation. Partial delegation mimicks mandatory inhouse provision whenever the principal decides not to outsource.
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same utility for the principal if 1θ ≤ φp. Summarizing the discussion, we therefore have
Proposition 7 The principal’s most preferred institution for allocation of autority is as follows:
If 0 ≤ φp ≤ H (θ) or 2G (θ) ≤ φp arm’s length and double delegation are optimal for the
principal.
If H (θ) ≤ φp partial delegation, double delegation and mandatory inhouse provision are
optimal for the principal.
If 1θ ≤ φp all modes are optimal for the principal.
3 One task: Quality Improvement
In this section we briefly look at the case where the important task is improvement and develop-
ment of the service rather than cost reductions. An example would be military procurement. In
the development of a stealth fighter, cost reductions have not been in the forefront, the quality
of the fighter appears much more important. The section provides part of the intuition for the
results we obtain when there are two important tasks, cost reductions and quality improvements.
Eﬀort is now directed at improving the service, we call such eﬀort eq. The eﬀort materializes
in plans for improvement, when they are implemented the resulting quality of the service is
Q (ec) = Q0 + eq. (26)
The eﬀort cost for the service provider is (1/2)e2q .
Inhouse provision: As above, the public manger recevives a quarter of the surplus, so his
optimizing eﬀort choice is eq = φa/4 and the principal’s utility from inhouse provision, when
she delegates to agency φa, becomes
uinq = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 +
1
2
µ
φa
4
¶2!
.
The first best choice of eﬀort is e∗q = φp and the optimal delegation under inhouse provision is
to an agency with φa = 4φp. It follows that delegation through mandatory inhouse provision
secures first best ressource allocation as does inhouse provision under partial (and, thus, double)
delegation.
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When the principal outsources, there will now be renegotiation with the firm, who owns the
plans for improvement of the service.19 The surplus is split and the optimizing eﬀort choice for
the firm is eq = φp/2. The outsourcing surplus between the firm and the principal is (5/32)φ
2
p.
Notice that this surplus is increasing in the principal’s type, the reason is that the firm has
stronger incentives to provide eﬀort than the public manager and the extra eﬀort is more val-
ueable the more the principal cares about the quality. The utility for the principal under arm’s
length delegation, when he delegates to agency φa, who outsources, is
uoq
¡
φp, θ
¢
= φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
2
¶
−
µ
C0 +
1
8
φ2a +
γ
32
5φ2a
¶
(27)
The outsourcing surplus is positive whenever φa = φp implying that no delegation and arm’s
length delegation induces outsourcing. The optimal agency maximizes (27), which gives
φa =
8
4 + 5γ
φp. (28)
The optimal agency puts more weight on quality than the principal. The reason is the incentive
eﬀect, which now also enters in relation to the firm. When eﬀort is directed at improving the
service, there is renegotiation with the firm - just as with the public manager. The mechanism
is similar to the one present with the public manager, by delegating to an agency with higher
preference for quality, the principal gives the firm stronger incentives, since the agency is more
willing to pay for improvements. This increased pay to the firm is again partly oﬀset in the
initial contracting, here the firm receives a price which covers the outside option, the eﬀort cost
- and unlike the public manager - also part of the surplus, depending on the degree of market
power. Market power therefore mitigates the incentive eﬀect. If there is no market power, the
optimal agency puts double as much weight on quality as the principal, reflecting that the firm’s
incentive is only half of what it ideally should be. The more market power the firm has, the
larger is the fraction it keeps of the outsourcing surplus. The principal responds by delegating
to a more moderate agency.
19We assume that the firm will only implement the quality improvement if it gets its share of the surplus.
Strictly speaking, the firm is indiﬀerent between implementing the quality improvement or not. However, in
reality this will most likely increase cost. At the cost of extra notation, this could have been introduced explicitly.
For notational simplicity, we just assume that the firm, when indiﬀerent, chooses not to implement the quality
improvement.
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Under double delegation, the principal can gain by delegating the outsourcing decision to an
agency, who is more reluctant to outsource. Given agency a2 conducts the renegotiation, the
outsourcing surplus for agency a1 is
Ωa1|a2 = φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
¶
−
µ
C0 +
1
8
φ2a2
¶
−
Ã
φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 +
1
2
µ
φa2
4
¶2!!
=
µ
1
4
φa1 −
3
32
φa2
¶
φa2 .
Hence, by choosing a1 and a2 such that φa1 =
3
8φa2 , and φa2 = 2φp, the principal can attain
first best and obtain an outsourcing price that leaves no surplus to the private service provider.
To sum up, delegation is very powerful in the case where the only task is quality improvement
and there is no trade-oﬀ as in the cost reduction case. First best can be achieved through
delegation under both public and private service provision.
4 Two tasks: Cost reduction and quality improvement
We now consider the case where the service provider has two tasks and directs eﬀort at cost
reductions, ec, as well as at development and improvement of the service, eq. In this case, the
quality of the service becomes
Q (ec, eq) = Q0 + eq − θec
For simplicity, we assume that the eﬀort cost is separable in the tasks, equal to (1/2) e2c and
(1/2) e2q respectively. The general case represents a mixture of the two cases discussed above.
From the previous sections we know that when cost reductions are crucial and the cost - quality
trade oﬀ is in focus, principals, who value quality less, outsource. When quality improvements
are crucial and cost reductions are not possible, all types outsource, and the outsourcing surplus
is higher the more the principal values quality. The two tasks, therefore, give diﬀerent incentives
and the results in the two-task case depend on how serious the quality deterioating eﬀects of
cost reductions are as reflected in the parameter θ, and how much the principal values quality as
given by φp. We will focus on the case, where cost reductions, although not irrelevant, involves
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a non-trivial trade oﬀ in relation to quality. This is the case when θ > 0, so cost reductions
hurt quality, and 1 − θφ ≥ 0, so that there will be cost reducing eﬀort. Since the comparative
statics wrt θ is clear from the previous sections and in order to simplify the exposition, we will
let θ = 1 in the following and accordingly restrict φp, φa, φa1 and φa2 to the interval [0,1]
20.
4.1 No delegation
Under no delegation, the pricipal takes all decisions herself. The public manager internalizes
1/4 of the surplus, so as above the eﬀort choices, under no delegation, are eq = φp/4 and
ec =
¡
1− θφp
¢
/4. The principal’s utility of inhouse service provision is
v˜in = φp
µ
Q0 +
φp
4
−
1− φp
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− φp
4
+
1
2
µ
φp
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− φp
4
¶2!
. (29)
When the principal outsources, the firm internalizes half of the surplus from quality improvement
and receives all cost reductions, it therefore chooses eq = φp/2 and ec = 1.
The principal pays the outsourcing price p0 and pays half of the gross surplus in the renego-
tiation, her utility therefore is
v˜out = φp
µ
Q0 +
φp
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
φ2p. (30)
In the Appendix we show that the outsourcing surplus equals21
Ω˜
¡
φp
¢
=
½
1
32
¡
5φ2p +
¡
3− 7φp
¢ ¡
φp + 3
¢¢
. (31)
which is simply the sum of the surplusses in the two individual cases considered above. The
principal outsources when the surplus is positive, which directly yields
Proposition 8 Under no delegation, the principal outsources in the two task case iﬀ
φp ≤ G˜ =
3
√
11− 9
2
≈ 0.475
20 It may appear a bit "crude" that we restrict the parameter space for the φ0s to [0,1]. By doing it we avoid
comparison with many cumbersome and unreasonable cases, where the optimal solution involves no eﬀort on cost
reduction. When φa > 1, there is no eﬀort on cost and φa can freely be increased by the principal in order to induce
more eﬀort on quality. Hence the cost-quality trade-oﬀ disappears. This feature appears in our setting, since the
utility from quality is linear, which has the advantage that we can get closed form solutions to the principal’s
delegation problem. Had we instead assumed that utility from quality was suﬃently convex, the optimal solution
would always involve some cost reducing eﬀort and the cost quality trade-oﬀ would always remain. In our simple
linear model, we obtain this feature by restricting the parameter space.
21The proofs of the two-task case left out in the text can be found in the Appendix.
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4.2 Delegation with two tasks
We now consider the various delegation regimes.
4.2.1 Mandatory inhouse provision
Under mandatory inhouse provision, the principal’s utility, when she chooses agency φa is
v˜in = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
4
− 1− φa
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− φa
4
+
1
2
µ
φa
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− φa
4
¶2!
(32)
and the preferred agency maximizes this among φa fulfilling 0 ≤ φa ≤ 1. This directly gives
Proposition 9 Under mandatory inhouse provision, principal φ0ps preferred agency is in the
two task case given by
φ˜
mi
a
¡
φp
¢
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if φp ≤ 38 ,
4φp − 32 if
3
8 ≤ φp ≤
5
8 ,
1 if 58 ≤ 1.
(33)
The choice of agency under mandatory inhouse provision is governed by the incentive eﬀect
and takes into account incentives to perform both eﬀort tasks. For φp < 1/2, we have that
φa = 4φp − 3/2 < φp, so the preferred agency puts less weight on quality than the principal,
while the opposite is true for φp > 1/2. In both cases, it reflects the incentive eﬀect: When φp is
low, the principal does not care so much about the quality of the service and the most important
issue is cost reductions. Strong incentives for cost reductions are provided by choosing an agency
with low φa, just as is the case when cost reductions is the only task. When φp > 1/2, on the
other hand, the most important task is improvements and therefore an agency with high φa is
chosen, just as is the case when improvements is the only task.
Since the principal has to balance the incentives for both tasks, the optimal agency does
not lead to first best eﬀort levels. The first best choice of eﬀorts are eq = φp and ec = 1 − φp,
while for φp ≤ 3/8 the eﬀort choices are eq = 0 and ec = 14 . For 3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 5/8, they are
eq =
¡
4φp − 32
¢
/4 = φp− 3/8 and ec =
¡
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢¢
/4 = 5/8−φp. For φp ≥ 5/8, the choices
are eq = 1/4 and ec = 0.
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4.2.2 Arm’s length delgation
Under arm’s length delegation, the principal chooses an agency, which takes care of both the
outsourcing decision and the renegotiation. This agency is in the same position as the principal
is under no delegation, hence outsourcing surplus between the agency and the firm is given by
(31) with φa substituted for φp.We can therefore directly infer that the agency outsources if and
only if
φa ≤ G˜ (34)
The principal’s utility if the agency outsources is therefore (compare with (30))
v˜out = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
(φa)
2 (35)
Since the firm’s share of the outsourcing surplus γΩ˜ (φa) equals the outsourcing price, p0, less net
costs, C0 − 1/2, plus net earnings from quality improving eﬀort (1/2)φa(φa/2) − (1/2)(φa/2)2,
the outsourcing price p0 equals
p0 = γΩ˜ (φa) + C0 −
1
2
− 1
8
φ2a
The principal’s utility if the agency chooses inhouse provision is as in (32). Maximizing over φa
in (32) and in (35) (inserting for the price), and taking into account the outsourcing condition
(34) then directly leads to
Proposition 10 In the two task case, principal φ0ps preferred agency φa under arm’s length
delegation and the outsourcing decision is given by:
eφala ¡φp¢ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
8φp+9γ
4−2γ if 0 ≤ φp ≤
1
2G˜−
3
√
11
8 γ outsourcing
G˜ if 12G˜−
3
√
11
8 γ ≤ φp ≤ G˜ outsourcing
G˜ if G˜ ≤ φp ≤ 14G˜+
3
8 inhouse
4φp − 32 if
1
4G˜+
3
8 ≤ φp ≤
5
8 inhouse
1 if 58 ≤ φp ≤ 1 inhouse
As when cost reductions is the only task, principals who care less about quality prefer
outsourcing, while principals who care much about quality prefers inhouse provision. Since the
provider will also spend eﬀort at improvements, principals, who care very little about quality,
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do not prefer agencies, who are at the brink at choosing inhouse provision (as was the case
when only cost reductions mattered). Although such agencies are optimal with respect to the
bargaining eﬀect, they will, through the incentive eﬀect, induce the firm to perform too much
quality enhancing eﬀort and the principal will have to pay for this through the price. The
principal is not intererested in that. A low φp principal therefore realizes that the bargaining
and the incentive eﬀects work in opposite directions, and she modifies the choice of agency, to
reduce the eﬀort spent on quality. The flip side of the coin is that this leaves some surplus to
the firm. The higher is market power, γ, the more important is the bargaining eﬀect, and the
higher φa is chosen. When φp is close to but still smaller than G˜, the principal’s choice of agency
is governed by the interest in reaping all surplus and the preferred agency has φa = G˜.
For larger φp ≥ G˜, the principal prefers inhouse provision. As we have seen above, when
φp is close to G˜, the principal is constrained in her choice of φa by the consideration that the
agency should not prefer outsourcing, therefore the optimal choice is φa = G˜. For larger φp, this
is not so and the results are as under mandatory inhouse provision.
As previously, the outsourcing decision is not aﬀected by arm’s length delegation. Whether
the principal decides herself or delegates the outsourcing decision to the agency, outsourcing
results if and only if φp < G˜ (θ).
The preferred agency is increasing in the principal’s type. Hence, if we consider a representa-
tive democracy, where principals are voters, the median voter’s preferred agency is a Condorcet
winner.
4.2.3 Partial delegation
Recall that under partial delegation the principal first decides on outsourcing and then chooses
an agency. At the time when the agency is chosen, the outsourcing price is therefore given. The
optimal choice of agency maximizes v˜out as given in (35) taking as given the outsourcing price
p0. This gives
φa = φp.
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When she outsources, the principal wishes to delegate to a type, who has the same preferences
as herself. We could also interpret this as she prefers not to delegate the decision. Unlike under
arm’s length outsourcing, the principal can not factor in that a higher renegotiation surplus to
the firm is oﬀset through a lower initial price, since the price is given when the agency is chosen.
Hence the incentive eﬀect is not present and the optimal agency has the same preferences as
the principal.
If the principal chooses inhouse provision her utility is given by (32). In the Appendix we
compare the relevant utilities from inhouse provision and outsourcing and show that
Proposition 11 Under partial delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing in the two task case
if and only if
φp ≤ Gˆ =
3
2
√
10
≈ 0.474.
If outsourcing is chosen, the principal prefers an agency of her own type. If inhouse provision
is chosen, the principal prefers an agency of type φ˜
mi
a
¡
φp
¢
as given in Proposition 9.
4.2.4 Double-delegation
Recall that under double-delegation, the principal delegates the outsourcing decision to agency
a1 and the authority to hire and conduct the post-contractual renegotiation to a diﬀerent agency,
a2. In the Appendix, we show that the outsourcing surplus between agency a1 and the firm in
this case is
Ω12 =
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 6φa2 − 2φ
2
a2 + 9
¢
Agency a1 therefore outsources iﬀ
φa1 ≤
6φa2 − 2φ2a2 + 9
24
(36)
The principal’s utility from outsourcing is (compare with (35))
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
(φa2)
2
The optimal choice of φa1 and φa2 when the principal goes for outsourcing maximizes this subject
to the restriction (36). In the Appendix we show that φa2 = 2φp, so the choice of agency a2
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gives optimal incentives on the quality improving task. The choice of agency a1 is made such
that this agency is indiﬀerent between outsourcing or not, so that the surplus is zero and the
price therefore as low as possible.
If the principal prefers inhouse provision, the principal’s utility is given by (32) (with φa2
substituting for φa) and the choice of agency a2 is exactly as under mandatory inhouse provision
as in Proposition 9. By comparing the relevant utility expressions for the principal in the two
cases, inhouse and outsoucing, we prove the rest of Proposition 12 in the Appendix
Proposition 12 Under double delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing in the two task case
if and only if
φp ≤ H˜ =
3
8
√
2 ≈ 0.53.
If outsourcing is chosen, the principal prefers an outsourcing agency, φa1, such that equation
(36) is satisfied with equality and a renegotiation agency of type φa2 = max[2φp, 1].
If inhouse provision is chosen, the principal prefers any outsourcing agency, φa1, such that
the relevant inequality in (41) in the Appendix is satisfied and a renegotiation agency of type
φa2 = φ˜
mi
a
¡
φp
¢
as given in Proposition 9.
Comparing the cases of partial and double delegation we notice that these two institutions
provide very diﬀerent outcomes under two tasks, which they did not do in the single task case.
There will be more outsourcing under double delegation than under partial delegation. The
intuition is the following. Under partial delegation we showed above that the bargaining eﬀect
is removed under outsourcing because the price is given at the time when the agency is chosen.
Under double delegation, the principal chooses the renegotiation agency before the outsourcing
agency has negotiated with the private firm. Hence, the private firm knows the preference of the
renegotiation agency and is willing to accept a lower price if it can foresee that compensation
will be higher in the renegotiation phase. Notice that if the principal promised to delegate to
the ex ante optimal renegotiation agency before she negotiated the price with the private firm,
the firm would recognize that such a promise would not be ex post optimal. When the price
is fixed at any level the principal will prefer a renegotiation agency with similar preferences
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as herself. Hence, the key in double delegation is the ability to commit to the renegotiation
agency before the price negotiations with the private firm. Since this improves the outcome
under outsourcing, it follows that we shall observe more outsourcing under double delegation
than under partial delegation.
4.3 Eﬀort and eﬃciency in the dual task case.
We are now ready to provide som intuitive comparison of the various provison modes for the
dual task case. Figures 2 and 3 show eﬀorts levels and net surplus for each of the diﬀerent modes
of service provision. 22
Part A in Figure 2 shows how investment in quality diﬀers across the diﬀerent modes of
service provision. First best eﬀort, e∗q = φp, is given by the solid grey line. The solid black
line yields the no delegation outcome. Notice it increases with half the slope of first best until
φp = eG reflecting that the private service provider internalises - through renegotiation - half of
the additional surplus generated from investing in quality. When φp exceeds eG, the principal
decides to switch from outsourcing to inhouse service provision, which implies a drop in quality
investment and that for higher φp the quality investment only increases with 1/4 of the slope of
first best quality investment. This reflects that the public manager internalises only a quarter
of the additional surplus generated by his investment in quality.
Arm’s length delegation is pictured by the dashed black line in the Figure. Notice that
by delegating to a higher type under both outsourcing and inhouse provision, the private firm
and the public manager will have significant higher incentives for investment in quality. Under
inhouse provision there is lower quality investment but it does increase with the same slope as
the first best quality investment until the restriction φa ≤ 1 is binding. When the service is
outsourced we notice that there will be an ineﬃciently high level of quality investment relative to
22Remember that we have throughout the two task case for simplicity assumed that the quality deterioration
parameter θ is one and we have restricted the preferences for quality parameters, φp, φa, φa1 and φa2 to be positive
and less than or equal to one. To draw the following figures we have in addition assumed that the market power,
γ, is a half, i.e. that the private firm and the principal (or the outsourcing agency) splits any outsourcing surplus
equally. We notice from above that we have marginally more outsourcing under partial delegation than under
arm’s length or no delegation (Gˆ ≈ 0.474 < 0.475 ≈ ?G). However, the diﬀerence is small. Thus, to improve
the readability of the figures we have oppressed the ticks for the Gˆ condition, which is overlapping with the ?G
condition.
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first best. This may seem odd from a first perspective, because it does not aﬀect the investment
in cost reduction. However, the principal prefers this because it increases the bargaining eﬀect.
The principal delegates to an agency, who puts more weight on quality and is a tougher negotiator
implying that the service is delivered at a lower price from the private company. The cost of
this is a distortion in quality investment.23
Partial delegation is the dotted grey line that combines no delegation under outsourcing
where the principal - due to the absence of the bargaining eﬀect - prefers not to delegate and arm’s
length delegation under inhouse provision where the presence of the incentive eﬀect provides
incentives to delegate.
Finally, Double delegation - the dotted black line - provides the most powerful incentives to
invest in quality. It leads to outourcing of service provision for a larger range of quality prefer-
ences than any other service provision modes. For the private provision case double delegation
solves the challenges facing the two former delegation modes: By picking the two agencies simul-
tanously it lowers the investment incentive relative to the arm’s length without compromising
on the bargaining eﬀect and relative to the partial delegation it provides optimal incentives and
exploits the bargaining eﬀect by picking the two agencies simultanously.
Part B of Figure 2 provides the reverse picture with respect to investment in cost reduction.
Again the downward sloping grey line is the first best investment in cost reduction, i.e. e∗c = (1−
φp). Remember that any private firm will choose e
∗
c = 1, thus we see that there is too much
cost reduction under private service production. Under public service provision, all alternative
provisions modes provide too few incentives for cost reduction. However, when delegation is
possible, the principal chooses to lower incentives to cost reduction even further because this
raises incentives to quality improvement. Notice also, that in a small area to the right of G˜,
mandatory inhouse and partial delegation provide slightly stronger incentives to cost cutting
than arm’s length and no delegation. The reason is that the former modes can pick a renego-
tiation agency that would like to outsource but who is not given the right to decide upon the
mode of service provision.
23Notice, that the quality eﬀort is constant under private provision due to that γ = 1/2 as is clear from
Proposition 10 above.
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Figure 3 pictures the net surplus derived from the service provision. Again the first best net
surplus is the grey curve at the top of the figure. No delegation (black line) approaches first best
for a principal who does not care about quality. However, the more the principal cares about
quality the larger is the reduction in net surplus due to to few incentives for quality investment
and too large incentives for cost reduction under private provision. When the service is produced
inhouse, the ineﬃciency of no delegation increases due to the insuﬃcient incentives for quality
improvement.
Delegation generally generate significantly more net surplus than no delegation under in-
house provision, i.e. when the principal cares about quality. The figure, therefore, suggests the
empirical implication, that delegation provides eﬃciency improvement for public services that
are clearly best provided inhouse. The benefit of delegation for extreme principals is restricted
by our restriction of the preference space. We have assumed that the most extreme principal
(φp = 1) cannot delegate to an even more extreme agency. This is the reason that all delegation
modes converges to the no delegation case for φp → 1.24
The trade-oﬀ between a cheaper price for the service and a distortion in quality investment
under outsourcing implies that arm’s length delegation generates lower net surplus than partial
delegation or no delegation for very low φp’s. The reason is that the price discount generated
by the principal’s choice does not show up in the netsurplus, since this is a redistribution from
the private firm to the public sector. This trade-oﬀ does not exist under double delegation
implying that double delegation always deliver the most eﬃcient service provision. However,
it is evident from the Figure that even double delegation cannot solve all eﬃciency problems
related to incomplete contraction when the principal cares about quality.
5 Conclusion
Most public service provision is done in environments where it is diﬃcult to contract upon on all
future contingences. This paper has identified two core eﬀects - the incentive and the bargaining
eﬀects - that makes delegation of decision authority a powerful policy instrument in managing
24 If we allowed for even more extreme agencies, the eﬃciency gain of delegation would increase in φp under
inhouse provision.
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public service provision: First by strategically delegating the right to hire and negotiate with
a public or private service provider, the principal can manipulate with the service provider’s
incentive to reduce cost and/or increase quality. Strategic delegation essentially becomes a
substitute for explicit incentive contracts. Second, by delegating the right to outsource to an
agency that is indiﬀerent between provison modes, the bargaining power of the private firm is
lowered implying that delegation can reduce the price of private provision of public service.
The analysis generated a number of empirically relevant implications: First, the decision to
outsource does not depend on the degree of competition among private service providers. If there
is a joint surplus from outsourcing the outsourcing price will be adjusted so that outsourcing
takes place. Second, we identified two empirical relevant ways of delegating the outsourcing
decision - arm’s length and partial delegation. Both types of delegation create more eﬃcient
ressource allocation than no delegation. Third, partial delegation is better than arm’s length
delegation at creating eﬃciency when service is produced inhouse.
A growing empirical literature investigate determinants of the choice of service provider in
public service provision (e.g. La Porta et al. (1997), Brown and Potoski (2003) and Levin
and Tadelis (2005)). This literature documents that political preferences, degree of contractual
incompleteness and complexity of service provisions are all important factors in deciding the
type of service provision. Our analysis highlights that delegation is an powerfull instrument in
such settings. However, we do not explicitly provide direct empirical support for our theoretical
results. We believe there are at least two challenges in doing so: First, as discussed in the
Introduction, the choice of delegation mode is only in limited amount directed by eﬃciency
considerations. In an election setting, most delegation will be arm’s length where the electorate
chooses a politician to be responsible for both the outourcing decision and the negotiation with
a private service provider. In the real world, double delegation is clearly not an option for the
electorate. However, partial delegation may be seen as a case of direct referendum, where the
electorate votes on outsourcing and delegates the implementation of the result to an elected
politician. Second, it is hard to think about counterfactuals for our delegation results because
almost all service provision imply some degree of delegation from the principal due to time and
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capacity constraints.
Delegation is an eﬃcient tool in providing better public service; however, our analysis also
highlights the limitation of delegation in mitigating more generally allocation distortions due to
contractual incompleteness. As discussed above, there are two necessary conditions for delega-
tion to work: First, delegation will increase the incentive part of a public manager’s remuneration
and, therefore, leave him or her with a larger stake in the post contractual renegotiation process.
The contracting agency must be able to foresee this and make a proportional reduction in the
public manager’s base salary. Second, the premise for delegation is that there exist suﬃciently
heterogenous preferences in the population over issues which are non contractible.
6 Appendix
Proofs for the two-task case.
For ease of exposition we will first consider double delegation, where principal delegates the
outsourcing decision to agent φa1 and the renegotiation to agent φa2. The other cases can then
be found by inserting in the relevant places for φa1 and φa2.
Agent φa1’s utility from inhouse provision, when renegotiation is delegated to agent φa2 is
v˜in12 = φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
4
− 1− φa2
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− φa2
4
+
1
2
µ
φa2
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− φa2
4
¶2!
(37)
Under outsourcing the firm gets all benefits from cost reduction and half of the gross surplus
between the firm and agent φa2 from quality improving eﬀort. The optimizing choices are
therefore ec = 1 and eq = φa2/2. The total expenditure for the principal is p0 plus what is paid
in the renegotiation, equal to half of the gross surplus, 12φa2
¡
1
2φa2
¢
. Agent φ0a1s utility from
outsourcing when φa2 renegotiates is therefore
v˜out12 = φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
(φa2)
2 (38)
The initial contract is between the firm and agent φa1. The parties foresee the subsequent
renegotiation and the firm gets a fraction γ of the total outsourcing surplus between the firm
and agent φa1. Call this surplus Ω12. Then u
f = γΩ12. The firm’s part of the surplus consists
partly of the initial outsourcing price p0 less costs C0, partly of net cost savings 1− 12 , and partly
of the renegotiation pay less eﬀort costs φa2
φa2
4 −
1
2
³
φa2
2
´2
= 18φ
2
a2, so
uf12 = γΩ12 = p0 − C0 +
1
2
+
1
8
φ2a2
which gives
p0 = γΩ12 −
1
8
φ2a2 + C0 −
1
2
(39)
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Recall that
Ω12 = v˜out12 + u
f
12 −
¡
v˜in12 + 0
¢
which gives
Ω12 =
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 6φa2 − 2φ
2
a2 + 9
¢
(40)
No delegation
Under no delegation all φ0s in the relevant formulas are φp. Hence (40) and a little manipu-
lation gives that the outsourcing surplus between the principal and the firm is given by equation
(31).
Partial Delegation
From Proposition 9 we know that if the principal chooses inhouse provision and φp ≤ 3/8
then φa = 0 and the eﬀort levels are eq = 0 and ec = 1. The utility to the principal in this case
is
vin = φp
µ
Q0 −
1
4
¶
− C0 +
7
32
.
The outsourcing surplus, when the pricipal is expected to choose agent φa = φp in case of
outsoucing, is therefore
Ω˜ =
³
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¢
= φp
µ
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4
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32
¶
which is positive for all φp ≤ 3/8. Hence all types φp ≤ 3/8 outsource.
If 3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 5/8, Proposition 9 gives that the optimal agency under inhouse provision is
φa = 4φp − 3/2, so that
vin = φp
Ã
Q0 +
4φp − 32
4
−
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!
−
⎛
⎝C0 −
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
+
1
2
Ã
4φp − 32
4
!2
+
1
2
Ã
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!2⎞
⎠
Inserting into Ω˜ =
¡
v˜out + u˜f
¢
−
¡
vin + 0
¢
, then gives
Ω˜ =
1
64
¡
9− 40φ2p
¢
.
Which yields Proposition 11:25
Double delegation
Using (38), (40) and (39) (and substituting φp for φa1 in (38)) the principal’s utility from
outsourcing can be written
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
γΩ12 −
1
8
φ2a2 + C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
(φa2)
2
25 It is straightforward to check that inhouse provision is also preferred for φp > 5/8.
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The optimal choice of φa1 and φa2 maximizes this subject to the restriction (36). This gives
φa2 = max[2φp, 1]
φa1 =
12φp − 2
¡
max[2φp, 1]
¢2
+ 9
24
=
½
1
2φp −
1
3φ
2
p +
3
8 if φp ≤
1
2
1
2φp +
7
24 if φp >
1
2
The choice of agent a2 gives optimal incentives on the quality improving task. The choice of
agent a1 is made such that this agent is indiﬀerent between outsourcing or not, so that the
surplus is zero and the price therefore as low as possible.
If the principal prefers inhouse provision, the choice of agent a2 is exactly as under mandatory
inhouse provision as in Proposition 9. Then the outsourcing surplus for agent a1 becomes
Ω12 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 9
¢
if φp ≤ 38
1
32
³
−24φa1 + 6
¡
4φp − 32
¢
− 2
¡
4φp − 32
¢2
+ 9
´
if 38 ≤ φp ≤
5
8
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 6− 2 + 9
¢
if 58 ≤ 1
and with choices af a2 as in Proposition 9 agent a1 will chose inhouse provision if φa1 fulfills
9
24 ≤ φa1 ≤ 1 if φp ≤
3
8
−64φ2p+96φp−9
48 ≤ φa1 ≤ 1 if
3
8 ≤ φp ≤
5
8
13
24 ≤ φa1 ≤ 1 if
5
8 ≤ 1
(41)
If φp ≤ 3/8, the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 2φp under outsourcing and φa2 = 0 under inhouse
provision. The principal’s utilities then are:
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
2φp
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
¡
2φp
¢2
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
¡
2φp
¢2
and
vin = φp
µ
Q0 −
1
4
¶
−C0 +
7
32
Hence vout > vin for φp ≤ 3/8.
If 3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 12 , the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 2φp under outsourcing and φa2 =¡
4φp − 32
¢
under inhouse provision. The principal’s utilities then are:
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
2φp
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
¡
2φp
¢2
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
¡
2φp
¢2
vin = φp
Ã
Q0 +
4φp − 32
4
−
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!
−
⎛
⎝C0 −
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
+
1
2
Ã
4φp − 32
4
!2
+
1
2
Ã
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!2⎞
⎠
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Hence vout − vin ≥ 0 iﬀ 964 −
1
2φ
2
p ≥ 0 or
φp ≤
3
8
√
2 ≈ 0.530 33
So vout > vin for3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 1/2.
If 1/2 ≤ φp ≤ 5/8, then the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 1 under outsourcing and φa2
=
¡
4φp − 32
¢
under inhouse provision. The principal’s utilities then are:
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
1
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
vin = φp
Ã
Q0 +
4φp − 32
4
−
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!
−
⎛
⎝C0 −
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
+
1
2
Ã
4φp − 32
4
!2
+
1
2
Ã
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!2⎞
⎠
and vout − vin ≥ 0 iﬀ φp ≤ 18
√
5 + 14 = 0.529 51
Finally, if 5/8 ≤ φp, then the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 1 under outsourcing and φa2
= 1 under inhouse provision. The principal’s utilities are
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
1
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
vin = φp
µ
Q0 +
1
4
− 1− 1
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− 1
4
+
1
2
µ
1
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− 1
4
¶2!
and vin > vout iﬀ 1332
4
3 < φp . As
5
8 >
13
32
4
3 , v
in > vout for all φp ≥ 5/8. This completes the Proof
of Proposition 12.
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Figure 1: Efficiency HOneTask: Cost ReductionL.
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Figure 2a: Quality Improving Effort.
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Figure 2b: Cost Reducing Effort.
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Figure 3: Efficiency HTwo Tasks: Quality Improvement andCost ReductionL.
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